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Abstract: The Syrian civil war exacerbated sectarian divisions between the Alawite-ruled Syrian government 
and Syria’s Sunni population, straining also the relations between the Sunni majority and Alawite and Alevi 
minorities of the neighboring Turkey. The Alawites and Alevis of Turkey were predominantly supporting 
Syria’s president Bashar al-Asad, while the Turkish government greatly supported the Sunni insurgents of 
Syria. The paper aims at examining how Alawites and Alevis have influenced the relations between Turkey 
and Syria in the light of the Syrian civil war, the reasons behind the sympathy of Alevis for the Syrian 
government and the implications that Turkey’s Syria policy has had domestically. It finds that the Alevi / 
Alawite factor has had some restraining effects on Turkey’s antagonistic policy towards Syria. In the 
introductory part, the article touches upon the differences and the similarities between Alevis and Alawites, 
then it analyzes the developments in regards Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian crisis that were also 
reflected in Ankara’s domestic policy vis-à-vis its Alevi and Alawite minorities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to understand the role that Alevis and Alawites play in the relations 
between Turkey and Syria and the impact they have on them, first of all, it is necessary 
to have an insight into their identities and the characteristics that differentiate them from 
the Sunni majority, as well as from each other. In English-language academic papers 
and in the media, there are two denominations that are being mainly used: Alawites or 
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Alawis and Alevis, in order to make a distinction between predominantly ethnically Arab 
Alawites, which are native to mainly Syria and Lebanon, and Turkish Alevis, ethnically 
Turkish and Kurdish, native mostly to Turkey’s southern provinces. Nevertheless, it is 
quite disputable how accurate these denominations are, as the word itself is the same, 
both in Arabic and Turkish, and means “followers of Ali”: both are called ‘Alawi in Arabic 
and Alevi in Turkish. However, we chose to use the most commonplace denominations 
met most widely both in academic papers and in the media: Alevis and Alawites. 
Alevis are a group of around 15 to 20 million people, living mostly in the south 
of Turkey. In spite of having roots in the early Islamic period, Alevis appeared as a 
separate group only centuries after the Prophet Muhammad. Until the 16th century they 
were known as Kızılbaş (red head), who had fought along the Safavids against Ottoman 
Turks, while the formers’ defeat to Sultan Selim I, had significantly affected the further 
fate of the group, making them a subject of constant persecutions (Stewart 2007, 51). 
Alevism or Kızılbaşism was based on beliefs that were spread in Eastern Anatolia before 
the 16th century, but the formation of the main axis around which this religious current 
is developed was laid by the Safavids (Jigulskaya 2013). 
Despite being under the Ottoman rule for several centuries the Alevis of 
Anatolia did not accept the Sunni Islam followed by the Ottomans. In modern days, 
along with many Alevis that identify themselves as ethnic Turks, around 20% of the Alevi 
population carries Kurdish ethnicity (Stewart, 2007, 51), like the Zaza Kurds, that 
predominantly live in the province of Dersim (Tunceli). Alevis have organized many 
rebellions against the Turkish state, the greatest of which was staged in 1937 in Dersim 
by Alevi Zaza population and was brutally defeated by the Turkish army (Kaya 2011, 116). 
The ethnic diversity of Alevis, added to their religious identity, has created more 
difficulties for the Turkish state, given the strong nationalism of many of these Kurdish 
Alevis. Anyawy, regardless of the fact that a significant number of Alevis are Kurdish, all 
of them use Turkish in the cem, or ritual prayer, and there is no clear divide or 
dissension among Alevis in regards their ethnic identity (Stewart 2007, 51). The Alevi 
population in general is strongly secularist, loyal to the secular tradition of the Turkish 
republic, and opposes the religious state institutions, that actively promote Sunni Islamic 
interests, while Sunnis are mainly considered to be more inclined to the unity of religion 
and politics (Kaya 2011, 147). Thus, it seems that ethnicity does not have a great impact 
on the relationship between Kurdish and Turkish Alevis, and even the Arab Alevis 
(Alawites) of Turkey. The major factors that unite them and indentify them are their 
religious affiliation and their secularist views. The Alevi religious doctrine is focused 
around the deification of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad. Similar 
to Shi’ites, Alevis reject the first three Sunni caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman and 
accept the fourth one, Ali, believing that the latter’s place was taken by them, and 
considering Ali and his sons, Hasan and Hussein, as the rightful line of succession. 
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Alevism offers four paths to God, prioritizing the trinity of Allah, Muhammad 
and Ali (Stewart 2007, 52). Nonetheless Alevis should not be considered as Shi’ites, since 
they do not follow some of the five pillars of Islam, like the duty to make a hajj to 
Mecca, fasting during Ramadan etc. Moreover, Alevi scholars have limited familiarity 
with Qur'an and hadiths of traditional Islamic teaching. Alevis do not regularly attend 
mosques, but pray at cem houses, cemevis. Cem is the primary ritual of the worship 
ceremony during which they pray to Ali, recall the names of the first twelve imams, and 
mourn the martyrdom of Ali’s sons, Hasan and Husein (Stewart 2007, 53). 
Alevi cultural and religious traditions are significant with their gender equality in 
many respects, regardless of the existence of some distinct hierarchy. Men are 
considered dominant figures within Alevi society, as well as at the household, and 
women generally have to comply with their demands. Nevertheless, in comparison with 
mainstream Sunnis or Shi’ites, there is minimal physical separation of the sexes in daily 
life, and religious ceremonies. Men and women worship together at the cemevis, and 
take part in worship ceremonies, at the same time women may also have their own 
separate ceremonies, without the presence of men (Stewart 2007, 54). 
Thus, there is a distinct Alevi identity, notwithstanding with the fact that some 
ethnically identify themselves as Kurds, others as Turks. The Alevi term in Turkey has also 
been appropriated to describe several ethnic groups with heterodox traditions living in 
the Anatolia region. Among them are also the Arabic-speaking “Alevis”, living in 
southern Turkey, mostly in the Hatay province (the former Sanjak of Alexandretta), that 
was annexed to Turkey from Syria back in 1939. So, these are the Syrian Alawites, which 
are of Arabic ethnicity, and in Turkey are called Arap Aleviler (Arab Alevis). 
Alawites mostly live in the north eastern arc of the Mediterranean coastline, 
between northern Lebanon, and the Cilician plain in modern-day Turkey. In Syria 
Alawites are approximately 3 million people, which are around 12-15 percent of the 
population (Goldsmith 2011, 35). Alawites and Alevis are not ethnically related, but they 
share a lot of cultural and religious similarities. Alawite doctrines date back to the 9th 
century A.D and were advocated by Ibn Nusayr, who is considered to be the founder of 
the Alawi religion (Pipes 1989). While according to Faksh, Alawites emerged as a 
religious sect in Syria in the 10th and 11th centuries that incorporated several Islamic, as 
well as non-Islamic doctrines (Faksh 1984, 135). The Alawite belief includes elements of 
Shi’i Islam, Christianity and paganism. The Alawites adopted several concepts from 
paganism, like the concept of a divine triad with its subsequent manifestations in the 
seven circles of world history, and the idea of transmigration of souls. For Alawites, God 
revealed Himself to the world seven times, each time incarnated in two figures, who, 
together with God composed the holy trinity (Faksh 1984, 135). Many Alawite rituals 
have been borrowed from Christianity, like the use of wine in rituals and the celebration 
of Christmas (Faksh 1984, 136).  
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In regards the idea of Alawism being a mix of different Islamic and non-Islamic 
beliefs, Springett points out to influences on the Alawite or Nusairi religion from 
Zoroaster and the Magians. One of the proofs of the influence of Zoroaster and the 
Magians on the religion of Alawites might be traced in the attribution of light as the 
symbol of Deity (Springett, 142). Alawites, also known as Nusayris, after Ibn Nusayr, 
similar to Alevis were denounced by the majority Sunnis for their “religious heresy”, and 
both suffered heavily under the Ottoman rule for over 4 centuries (Stewart 2007, 52). 
Daniel Pipes argues, that by most standards Alawites should not be considered 
Muslims, since they reject Islam’s main tenets, and while the Muslim proclamation is, 
“there is no deity but God and Muhammad is his prophet”, Alawites assert that “there is 
no deity but ‘Ali, no veil but Muhammad, and no bab but Salman” (Pipes 1989). The 
controversy over Alawites’ Muslim or non-Muslim identity has been debated for 
hundreds of years, and there have been various opinions on that issue, but it is not an 
objective for this paper. Nonetheless, it seems necessary to mention that since 1930s a 
number of Sunni and Shi’ite clerics have issued fatwas declaring Alawites as Muslims, 
and after Hafez al-Asad became president in Syria, Imam Musa al-Sadr, a prominent 
Shi’ite cleric issued a similar fatwa in 1973 in support of Hafez al-Asad, whose legitimacy 
was being challenged by some Sunnis that claimed he did not comply to the clause in 
the Syrian Constitution which asserted that the President of Syrian Arab Republic should 
be a Muslim (Kramer 1987, 243). This seemed to close the topic at the time and Alawites 
have ever since been largely viewed as a branch of Twelver Shi’ites.  
Thus, it can be stated that Alevis and Alawites or Alawis, do have a number of 
differences, along with scores of similarities. Nonetheless, the existent differences do not 
lead to any animosity between them, be it between Syrian Arab Alawites and Alevis, in 
general, or between Kurdish and Turkish Alevis. This could be attributed to the overall 
liberal nature of both currents and the lack of deep religiousness, which, on the 
opposite, can be observed among Sunnis, for instance, or other Shi’ites. The similar 
denominations of these groups, meaning followers of Ali, also imply solidarity among 
them in terms of regular people.  
 
THE SYRIAN CRISIS AND THE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN  
TURKEY’S ALEVIS AND SYRIA’S ALAWITES 
 
The beginning of the Syrian uprising since March 2011, following the so-called 
“Arab Spring” revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, gradually increased the sectarian 
tensions in Syria, spreading also to the rest of the region. The protests in the country 
with a Sunni majority of around 70 percent against president Bashar al-Asad, a 
representative of the Alawite minority of around 12 percent, naturally did take on 
sectarian overtures, which were also reflected in neighboring Turkey, where around 20 
percent of the population identify themselves as Alevis, though unlike Syria, Turkey is 
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led by the representatives of the Sunni majority. After a short period of hesitation the 
Turkish government started avowedly supporting the Syrian rebels fighting against the 
Alawite president, and directed fierce criticism against the latter, showing solidarity with 
Syria’s Sunni majority, thus putting an end to a decade long Turkish-Syrian 
rapprochement. The danger of a Sunni takeover of the country, after the rebels had a 
number of victories against the Syrian army in different locations, and especially after 
the advent of ISIS into the Syrian scene, increased the Alawite fears of extermination 
under a possible Sunni rule. 
Erdoğan and other Turkish officials stated many times since the outbreak of 
insurgency that Ankara considers the Syrian issue as a domestic issue for Turkey 
(BIRGÜN 2011), mostly pointing out to the long border and the established close ties 
between the two states. Ankara’s perception of the events in Syria as a “domestic issue” 
was based on two main factors: the geographical factor, considering the common 
border of over 800 kilometers, and the demographic one, considering the existent 
sectarian diversity in both countries, with a similar formation, but different sizes: the 
existence of a Sunni majority and an Alevi / Alawite minority on one hand, and a Kurdish 
factor on the other (Ash-Sharq al-Awsat 2011). 
Overall, Ankara had two main interests in post-2011 Syria: to ensure that the 
Asad regime is replaced by a Sunni Islamist power and to forestall the apparition of a 
Kurdish autonomous entity in the north of Syria (Okyay 2017, 834). And in meeting both 
these ends, Ankara had to take into consideration also the Alevi factor, which could be 
an obstacle for both, since the majority of Alevis would certainly oppose the policy 
aimed at installing a Sunni Islamist regime in Syria, while a part of them, at least the 
ones who identify themselves as ethnically Kurdish, would oppose hostilities against their 
Kurdish brethren in Syria. Turkey’s bias in favor of Sunnis was demonstrated in AKP’s 
(the Justice and Development Party) domestic policy since the early period of the Syrian 
conflict. Since 2011 the AKP leaders accused the opposition CHP (Republican People’s 
Party) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu in supporting the Syrian government, represented by 
Syrian Alawite Bashar al-Asad, thus, unwittingly alleging sectarian solidarity between 
Turkish Alevis and Syrian Alawites. Prime Minister Erdoğan directly accused Kilicdaroglu 
and the CHP in being Alevis, and therefore Alawites. The Turkish PM had even 
announced that one should not “forget that a person’s religion is the religion of his 
friend. Tell me who your friend is and I’ll tell you who you are” (Shwartz 2012). 
Anyway, the shift in Turkey’s stance towards the Asad government did not 
happen so abruptly and was officially demonstrated only after June 12 parliamentary 
elections. Since March, during the first couple of months of the “Syrian Spring”, Turkey’s 
official stance was one of a friend both to the Syrian authorities, with Bashar al-Asad at 
its head, and the Syrian people. Ankara was emphasizing the friendship between the 
two states along with the calls for implementing reforms (Reuters 2011).  
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This, besides being a somewhat neutral policy of waiting for more 
developments with a view to be able to decide which side to support eventually, can 
also be regarded as a way for AKP of not losing prestige and potential voters, 
particularly among the Alawite and Alevi minorities of the country, before the nearing 
June 12 parliamentary elections. Ankara’s explicit support for the Sunni rebels, fighting 
against Syria’s Alawite president would certainly result in losing many votes. So the AKP 
refrained from taking a radical stance towards the Syrian conflict before the elections. 
Weeks after the elections, where the AKP won around 50 % of the vote and 327 
seats (out of 550) in Turkey’s parliament (Esen and Ciddi, 2011), Ankara’s posture 
towards Damascus greatly changed. Turkey started pursuing more active policy for 
reaching the overthrow of Asad, facilitating the Syrian opposition’s activities within 
Turkey, as well as supplying arms to the Syrian insurgents (Karaveli 2012). Thus, Turkey 
appeared in a confrontation with the Alawite regime in Syria, embracing the Sunni 
cause in the neighboring country and beyond. Ankara adopted an interventionist 
regional policy, with sectarian overtones, which, besides the support to the Syrian Sunni 
rebels, manifested in developing links with Sunni elites in Iraq, and supporting the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Tank 2014, 11). Many analysts noted that Turkey started 
using sectarian language more and more, playing the role of “the Sunni elder brother” 
in the region (Gettleman 2012). The deterioration of Turkish-Syrian relations in the 
context of these developments signaled the final failure of the “zero problems with 
neighbors” policy, as the rapprochement with Damascus had been its main 
achievement. If in 2008 Ankara was praised for its potential of speaking to all regional 
powers from Iran to Israel, thanks also to its relations with Damascus, it “now aligned 
predominantly with conservative Sunni Muslim partners such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
and is being increasingly seen as a partisan actor” (ICG 2013). 
In the process of implementing its Sunni-oriented policy Ankara did little to 
meet the Alevi and Alawite concerns in that regards. As Karaveli argues, the Erdoğan 
government, “while sponsoring the Sunni cause” in Syria, “made no attempt to show 
sympathy for the fears of the country’s Alawite, Christian and Kurdish minorities” 
(Karaveli 2013). 
Nonetheless, the AKP took some steps, seemingly aimed at calming the Alevi 
sentiments within the country against the government, but apparently also directed at 
decreasing the popularity of the CHP among them, thus trying to “kill two birds with one 
stone”. In November 2011, Ankara for the first time publicly apologized for the Dersim 
massacres (Hurriyet, 24 Nov 2011). The announcement, made by Erdoğan, on the one 
hand aimed at appeasing Turkish Alevis, displeased with the government’s assistance to 
the insurrection against the Alawite al-Asad, while on the other hand, it sought to 
discredit the CHP, as Erdoğan reminded in his speech that the latter ruled Turkey during 
the period of massacres in Dersim, saying, “if someone is to apologize for and face up 
to this tragedy, it is not the AKP and the AKP government but the CHP, the author of 
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this bloody episode, as well as the CHP deputies and the CHP chairman who hails from 
Tunceli [Dersim]” (Hurriyet 24 Nov 2011). So this neither seemed to be an apology that 
could be accepted by Alevis, nor could it dispel their fears or distrust towards the 
government. The CHP leader Kilicdaroglu, a Kurdish Alevi, was being targetted, as he 
had condemned Erdoğan’s anti-Asad stance in several occasions, describing it as “an 
interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring state that could cost Turkey dearly” 
(Sidki, 29). During an Alevi gathering in Istanbul in 2012, the main issue that was 
discussed by the participants was the threat posed to Syria’s Alawite minority. A Turkish 
Alevi leader noted that “some groups fighting Assad’s regime were identifying with 
historical Sunni figures who fought the formerly repressed Alawite minority” (DW 22 
March 2012), considering this as a clear sign of their intentions towards Alevis and 
fearing that their success would lead to massacres of Alawites, and they would be 
expelled from the country. The CHP, similar to Damascus, viewed the insurgence in 
Syria, as an “imperial conspiracy” against a government that was one of the principal 
supporters and advocates of the Palestinian resistance. The Turkish opposition party 
insisted that the conspiracy aimed at dividing Syria “into sectarian and ethnic clashes”, 
which could have its implications also in Turkey (Sidki, 30). 
In the context of the discussions over a possible military confrontation between 
Turkey and Syria, Cagaptay suggests that a Turkish military intervention in Syria could 
be viewed by Turkish Alevis as a “Sunni attack” against “fellow Alevis” (Cagaptay 2012). 
So, the Turkish public support for active Turkish intervention in Syria was fairly limited. 
Anyway, though several incidents of direct military clashes between Turkish and Syrian 
forces have occurred, the first one being the downing of a Turkish in June 2012 (Karaveli 
2012), they never grew into a full-scale war between Turkey and Syria, as some 
predicted. After Turkey had cut all ties with Damascus and gave up negotiations, the 
CHP continued keeping in touch with al-Asad. They sent a delegation to Syria, that 
visited Damascus, Hama and Latakia to observe the conditions there, and at the end it 
stated the party’s opposition to foreign intervention in Syria’s domestic affairs.  
In March 2013 the CHP deputies visited Bashar al-Asad in Damascus, reinstating 
their rejection of foreign interference in Syria (Cagaptay 2013). The sense of solidarity 
between Alawites and Alevis was translated into sympathy for Asad. Eichler quotes the 
words of an Alawite resident of Antakya, “after the events in Syria, most of the Alevi 
people in Turkey have supported Assad as he is Alevi or Alawite, and they believe they 
are under threat. Actually, they are not interested in Assad’s personality or what he has 
done” (Eichler 2014). This seems to summarize the reasons behind popular Alevi 
sympathy for the Syrian regime and shows that Ankara’s policy in regards the Syrian 
crisis, as well as its domestic policy towards the Alevi and Alawite minorities, especially 
during the Syrian crisis, consolidated the ties between Alevis in Turkey and Alawites in 
Syria, further boosting the existing sympathy and solidarity between them. Ankara did 
make some attempts to break the solidarity between Alevis and Syrian Alawites, but 
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they had either the opposite effect or none at all. During this period several articles 
could be found in Turkish newspapers speaking about the differences between Alevis 
and Syrian Alawites or Nusayris, mostly pointing out to the variations in their religious 
beliefs and practices (Ensonhaber 2012; T24 2012; Akyol 2012). Most of such publications 
were merely propaganda and this narrative can mainly be viewed as an attempt of 
convincing or showing to Turkey’s Alevis that they and Arab Alevis (Alawites) are not the 
same, and to some extent neutralize their support for and solidarity with Syrian Alawites, 
in general, and the Alawite government of Bashar al-Asad, in particular. 
These kinds of attempts had no serious results, mainly because the solidarity 
between Alevis and Alawites is not based only on the religious similarity, rather the 
closeness of their ideological beliefs. This is confirmed by the statement of a former 
head of Turkey’s Alevi Institute, Cengiz Güleç, made in an interview to the Turkish 
Aksam newspaper in September 2012, saying that the Alevis’ sympathy for Asad was not 
just stemming from religious considerations, but also, and more than that, from 
ideological insights. According to Güleç, most of the Alevis are close to the leftist 
ideology, while the Ba’as regime in Syria is also leftist, and is the strongest resistance 
power in the Palestinian issue (Aksam 2012). Turkey’s policy in regards the Syrian conflict 
was most negatively accepted in the province of Hatay (the former Sanjak of 
Alexandretta), which is very sensitive with its ethnic and religious diversity, being 
populated by the largest proportion of Arabs, especially Arab Alawites, along with Sunni 
Arabs, Arab Christians, Kurds, Circassians and Armenians. The overwhelming majority of 
Hatay Alawites are secular and in opposition to the Islamist AKP and generally support 
the CHP, and as Ankara started supporting Syria’s opposition and armed rebels, the 
anti-AKP sentiments further increased among them. Turkish Alevis, also being secular 
and supportive of the CHP, would, as Cagaptay argues, follow the Arab Alawites of 
Hatay in case of more rigorous protests against Ankara’s policy towards Damascus 
(Cagaptay 2013). 
Since 2011 several demonstrations had been organized in Hatay mainly by 
Alawites, but also with the support of some other minorities. Local Alawite groups, like 
“Platform against imperialistic interference in Syria”, organized a number of pro-Asad 
rallies during this period, the largest of which was held in September 2012, where 
around 10 thousand people took the streets (Cagaptay 2013). In February 2012 a few 
thousands protested in Antakya in favor of the Asad government in Syria and against 
the US and Turkish intervention. Many Alawites expressed their anger with Ankara’s 
policy towards Damascus, as well as the government’s treatment of the Alawite minority. 
However, as an observer notes, they were not so supportive of the Asad government, as 
they were worried about the silence on the murders committed by the “opposition 
forces” in Syria, and the AKP was perceived as collaborator of the US and the protector 
of the Muslim Brotherhood (Cicektakan 2012). 
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These pro-Asad sentiments and solidarity in the southern parts of Turkey, 
triggered also by the AKP’s pro-Sunni rhetoric, brought up additional difficulties for 
Ankara in implementing their Syrian policy. As Ankara had already crossed the point of 
return in its relations with Damascus, it wanted to reach the ousting of Asad and 
facilitate the installment of a Sunni government in Syria, even by the way of direct 
military intervention. Nevertheless, there were many obstacles for Turkey in doing that, 
among which was also the Alevi / Alawite factor. As Cagaptay argues, it made Turkey 
think twice before intervening in Syria, since the rising sectarian tensions could bring the 
fighting into its own territory (Cagaptay 2013). 
 
THE SECTARIAN TENDENCIES IN ANKARA’S SYRIA POLICY AND  
ITS DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS FOR TURKEY 
 
Turkey’s Sunni-oriented stance and rhetoric towards the conflict in Syria had 
caused sectarian tensions within the country increasing the sense of vulnerability among 
Alevis and Alawites, thus feeding more social tensions. Ankara’s policy of allowing the 
Syrian armed rebels to use Turkish territories as a foothold for fighting the Syrian 
authorities had left Turkey’s border regions in danger of attacks. This fact was 
emphasized in May 2013 when a car-bomb explosion occurred in Reyhanli in Hatay, 
killing 53 people (Eichler 2014). The Turkish officials attributed the responsibility of the 
explosion to the Syrian intelligence and a secret Turkish Alevi organization, while 
Erdoğan accused Alevis of collaborating with Syrian intelligence in carrying out the 
attacks (Barél 2013). Furthermore, when speaking about the attacks, and referring to 
fatalities, Erdoğan said “our Sunni citizens” (Çandar 2016), thus publicly announcing a 
special attitude and care for Sunnis, to the detriment of Alevis. Following the Reyhanli 
explosion and several other cross border mortar shelling cases and bomb attacks, 
Turkish authorities declared the launching of different projects aimed at enhancing the 
border security, including the erection of walls at several points of the border (Okyay 
2017, 839). These projects started being implemented in October 2013, and by 2014, 
Ankara had built 13 kilometres of walls, dug around 300 kilometres of ditches, and 
installed 160 kilometres of barbed wire along its Syrian border and by 2015, half of the 
40.000 military personnel guarding Turkey’s borders were deployed at the Syrian border 
(Okyay 2017, 839).  
These steps came as countermeasures for Turkey’s earlier policy of relaxing 
border controls aimed at facilitating the entrance of Syrian refugees to Turkey, which 
had also contributed to Alevi and Alawite concerns. Since the beginning of the unrest in 
Syria in March 2011, Ankara had adopted a policy of nearly unconditional opening of the 
borders to people fleeing Syria, calling it the “open door policy”. This was mainly aimed 
at emphasizing “on human rights, democracy and humanitarian sensitivities” in Turkey’s 
regional policy, while more pragmatically delegitimizing the regime of Bashar al-Asad 
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by “substantiating Ankara’s claims about atrocities committed by it” (Okyay 2017, 837-
838). Turkey’s open border policy in the Hatay province resulted in the arrival of large 
numbers of Sunni Arab refugees, destabilizing the demographic and sociological 
balance of the region. This, along with the free circulation of armed rebels in border 
areas caused an increase in the Alawites’, as well as other non-Sunni or non-Muslim 
communities’ perceptions of insecurity. This policy was interpreted by Alawites as part of 
Ankara’s project of “Sunnification of the region” (Okyay 2017, 838), a view that was 
largely shared also by the Turkish Alevi community and other secular elements of the 
Turkish society (Hinnebusch 2015, 20). Several refugee camps and surrounding areas 
were often used by Syrian opposition fighters as sanctuaries for meeting with families, 
receiving medical treatment, and purchasing supplies (ICG 2013). This was also 
exacerbating the “sensitive ethnic and sectarian balances, particularly in Hatay province”. 
Tensions were noticed between Hatay Alawites and Sunni refugees from Syria, who 
were viewed by some Hatay Alawites not merely as refugees, but fighters who had killed 
or endangered their families and brethren in Syria. Complaints were reported from 
some Alawite businessmen and public officials that they had been threatened and in 
some cases blacklisted or intimidated by Sunni refugees (Cagaptay 2013). Many Alawites 
and Alevis blamed the Turkish government for intentionally placing refugee camps near 
their localities, thus trying to kick them out of their historic strongholds by replacing 
them with Sunni Syrian refugees (Nawa 2017). The sense among the Hatay population 
that AKP was playing the sectarian card and deepening religious and ethnic divisions 
was reinforced by the introduction of a law in December 2012 (Resmi Gazete 2012), that 
would reorganize provincial boundaries and separate Antakya along sectarian lines. It 
was implemented in 2014, and all Alawite districts were gathered under a new name, 
neighborhood of Defne, while the majority Sunni quarters became Antakya. The 
residents of the city started calling this new demarcation line “the Berlin Wall” (Letsch 
2013).  
Ankara also took some steps to reassert the “Turkishness” of Hatay, by printing 
textbooks for Syrian child refugees that showed it to be a province of Turkey, unlike 
those in Syria that had been including the region within Syria, despite the fact that it de 
facto belongs to Turkey (Abdulrahim 2013). 
These developments connected to the Syrian conflict, were also contributing to 
the anti-government sentiments among not only Hatay Alawites, but also Alevis of other 
regions. In 2014, Erdoğan’s election as Turkey’s first popularly elected president that 
consolidated the AKP’s position in power, and later on, the constitutional amendment of 
2017, that abolished the office of the Prime Minister, making Turkey a presidential 
republic, further increased the fears of Alevis for their position as a religious minority 
within a predominantly Sunni state (Tank 2014, 4). Alevis have for years demonstrated 
against the discrimination against them, connected to various occasions.  
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One of the main issues for Alevis has been the community’s official recognition 
as a religious minority, something that Ankara has been refusing to do up to the 
present. The Alevi community demands from the Turkish state to support Alevi religious 
services, for example, to recognize their religious leaders as such and recruit them as 
civil servants. Alevis also seek official recognition of their places of worship, cemevis, 
demanding state subsidies for the religion. After getting rejects by Turkish courts for 
these demands, the Alevi community has even applied to the European Court of 
Human rights, which announced its verdict in April 2016, ruling that the Alevis faced 
discrimination by the state, and were denied the right to freedom of religion (Hallam 
2016).  
Alevis seek the recognition of cemevis inasmuch as it will make the Diyanet 
(Directorate of Religious Affairs) provide financial means for building Alevi cemevis. 
Nevertheless, the financial means have not been the main issue, rather Ankara’s 
unwillingness or refusal to allow building cemevis. In several occasions when Alevis have 
been able to construct cemevis, the Turkish authorities have built Sunni mosques 
nearby. In September 2013, the ground-laying ceremony of building a Sunni mosque 
and an Alevi cemevi side-by-side was celebrated in Tuzlucayir , a suburb of Ankara, that 
raised protests among Alevis, which even led to clashes between protesters and the 
police. It is noteworthy that this suburb is around 80 % populated by Alevis, and the 
AKP had received less than 10% of the vote here in 2011 parliamentary elections 
(Tremblay 2013). It is obvious that by building Sunni mosques in such localities, Ankara 
has been trying to increase the Sunni influence there. 
In 2015 an Alevi cemevi was turned into a Sunni mosque in Osmancik, in 
northern part of Anatolia. Obviously, even if the Turkish state tolerates Alevism as a 
cultural identity, only Sunni mosques are recognized as places of Islamic worship. 
Erdoğan is quoted saying that cemevis are not places of worship, rather “a centre for 
cultural activities”, and that “Muslims should only have one place of worship”. There are 
also instances when the Diyanet builds mosques in Alevi towns which they do not need, 
and accredits Sunni imams (Kingsley, 2017). Moreover, Ankara continuously increases 
the number of religious schools, that concentrate on the teaching of Sunni doctrine, 
while in several places there are no secular schools at all (Kingsley 2017). These and 
several other similar steps have increased the Alevis’ fear of assimilation. 
In such context, the gradual increase of the numbers of Syrian refugees in 
Turkey that are now estimated at around 3.5 million (UNHSR 2018), the absolute 
majority of which are Sunnis, further deepened the sectarian division between Sunnis 
and Alevis. In 2016, for instance, the Alevi population around the southern Turkish town 
of Kahramanmaraş demonstrated against the construction of a refugee camp outside 
the city because of their distrust towards the Sunni refugees and the fear of sectarian 
tensions. The Economist quotes a Turkish human rights activist, saying that Alevis think 
“the refugees are jihadists, and the refugees think the villagers are Assad supporters” 
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(The Economist 2017). The refugee crisis in Turkey has created a general public 
resentment against the Syrian refugees, who are blamed for the country’s economic 
difficulties, and the opposition parties, like the CHP, used these sentiments against 
Erdoğan during the campaign for the presidential and parliamentary elections of 24 
June 2018 (Beevor 2018).  
Turkey’s controversial stance towards ISIS, and its activities in Syria, has been 
another factor in the Sunni-Alevi divide. Ankara refused to open the Incirlik airbase for 
the coalition forces that were bombing ISIS, because, as Kadri Gursel states, “AKP 
ideologoues see ISIS as a Sunni actor and thus attribute the group a certain rationale” 
(Gursel 2015). Although, after around two months of hesitation, Turkey agreed to allow 
the US launch air strikes against ISIS from the Incirlik airbase (Reuters, 2015), it did not 
change the Alevi perception of the AKP’s pro-Sunni nature. When in August 2016 
Ankara finally decided to send troops to fight against ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 
self-proclaimed caliph of the Islamic State, manifestly threatened Ankara, declaring jihad 
against Turkey. Over the years of 2015 and 2016 ISIS bombings killed hundreds of 
people in Turkey, from different religions and ethnicities (Nawa 2017). Alevis felt most 
endangered inasmuch as along with sectarian differences between them and Sunnis, 
they live close to Turkey’s borders which were under direct threat of ISIS. Several 
incidents of Alevis being a direct target of different ISIS operations and attempted 
strikes, were uncovered by Turkish police during 2016 (Nawa 2017).  
Alevis were also one of the main targets during and after the coup attempt 
against Erdoğan on 15 July 2016. On the night of the failed coup d’état, fights broke out 
in the Gezi neighborhood between AKP supporters and Alevis that were not willing to 
join the demonstrations in support of Erdoğan, and therefore were denounced as 
traitors. The government started a crackdown against Alevis and many were arrested for 
allegedly cooperating with what Ankara calls the “Fethullah Terrorist Organization” 
(FETO), naming it after the exiled Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, who was accused by 
Erdoğan for being behind the failed coup (Bulut 2018).  
Thus, despite the fact that the Sunni Islam has always been predominant in 
Turkey, during the AKP rule the country’s state identity has been gradually altered, 
distancing from Kemalist secularism towards an extra emphasis on majoritarian Sunnism 
(Tank 2014, 4), which became more obvious by Ankara’s policy towards Damascus, 
particularly during the initial phase of the Syrian crisis. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Drawing conclusions based on this research it can be stated that Alevis and 
Alawites are two distinct religious groups, who, along several differences, share a 
number of similarities, that turn out to be the decisive factors in their mutual sympathy 
and solidarity. Their almost identical concurrent denominations, in spite of their different 
origins, their religious similarity and the similar differences they have with mainstream 
Sunni Islam, along with their secular ideologies and the lack of religious fundamentalism 
among them seem to be the key uniting characteristics between them. 
The deterioration of the relations between Turkey and Syria in the aftermath of 
the advance of the “Arab Spring” to Syria, and Turkey’s sectarian approach and policy 
towards the Syrian conflict reinforced the existing solidarity between Alevis and Alawites.  
Ankara’s stance against the government in Syria, ruled by Arab Alevis or Alawites, and 
its logistical, financial as well as military support to jihadist Sunni forces to topple the 
Damascus regime, meant the almost irreversible breaking off of Turkish-Syrian 
partnership of over a decade. Turkey’s intentions to overthrow Bashar al-Asad and 
install a Sunni regime in Damascus were opposed by its Alevi and Alawite minorities, a 
fact, that created difficulties for Ankara’s new Syria policy. In this regards, we suggest, 
that, if Ankara had had public support among Alevis for its stance from the 
developments in Syria, it might have intervened militarily in Syria in an early period of 
the conflict, seeking to overthrow the Asad government. But, as we saw, at least the 
majority of its Alevi and Alawite population were against any military intervention in 
Syria, and such a step by Ankara might have had unwanted developments for Turkey. 
Thus, the Alevi / Alawite factor, of course among other geopolitical considerations, had 
some preventive or mitigatory effects on Turkey’s antagonistic plans in Syria. It also has 
the potential of being a stabilizing factor in Turkish-Syrian relations in the future, if 
Ankara ceases to pursue a sectarian policy in the region and within the country, 
considering the Alevis’ inclination of having good relations with Syria. Nevertheless, 
Erdoğan’s Syria policy, with its sectarian overtones, had some negative repercussions for 
Turkey domestically. The primacy of Sunni identity in the AKP’s regional foreign policy, 
and especially its Syria policy, resulted in the growth of the Sunni-Alevi polarization 
within Turkey.  It increased the tensions between Sunnis and Alevis, further emphasizing 
the distrust and fears of its Alevi, as well as Alawite minorities, towards Erdoğan’s Islamist 
government.  
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